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pass. On the other hand if the deed is restrictive in the sense that
the deed grants to the railroad only an easement or right-of-way
and the consideration is commensurate with the condemned land,
the grantee railroad should take only an easement.
Each taking should be scrutinized carefully in light of the applicable statutes and judicial interpretations to determine in any given
situation whether the taking is essential to the indispensable use
of the railroad.1ol
JOHN L. PLATTNER
KENNETH F. JOHANNSON.

THE DUTY OF AN AUTOMOBILE PASSENGER
TO EXERCISE CARE
What conduct on the part of a passenger in an automobile constitutes contributory negligence barring a recovery in case of an accident? What affirmative steps must a passenger take for his safety?
This paper is an attempt to answer these questions in the light of
the changing technology of automotive travel. At the outset a few
definitions are in order.
Many states have enacted statutes limiting the liability of a driver
of an automobile for injuries to guests to situations involving either
gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intoxication.1 In such
jurisdictions a "guest" is defined, for the purpose of applying the
statutes, as a person whom the owner or possessor of a motor
vehicle invites to ride with him as a gratuity. 2 A "passenger", conversely, is defined as a person conveyed for hire from one place to
another, and the relationship between carrier and passenger is con3
tractual.
This latter definition is, for purposes of the present discussion,
somewhat too restrictive in character. It has been astutely observed that whatever the technical legal significance of the term
"passenger" may be, in common parlance it means an occupant of
a motor vehicle other than the person operating it and describes a
physical status rather than a technical legal status. 4 Many courts,
101. East Alabama Ry. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 (1885); Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S.
490 (1893); Rose v. Bryant, 251 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1952).
1. E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 39-15. For general discussion of these enactments, see
11 U. Cin. L. Rev. 24 (1937).
2. See Taylor v. Austin, 92 Ga.App. 104, 88 S.E.2d 192 (1955); Allison v. Ely, 159
N.E.2d 717, 722 (Ind. App. 1959).
3. Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935); Bentley v. Oldetyme
Distillers, 71 N.D. 52, 298 N.W. 417 (1941).
4. Vogrin v. Hedstrom. 220 F.2d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 1955).
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knowingly or otherwise, adopt this non-technical point of view in
their decisions; and this usage will similarly be observed in the
present paper. The discussion does not include, however, any
analysis of the duties, of passengers in busses, streetcars, and taxicabs, since the existence of a contract for carriage normally means
that their rights are determined by a different standard.
Ordinarily a passenger in an automobile is liable only for his own
negligence and the negligence of the operator of the vehicle is not
imputable to him.' But this rule is qualified by a number of potential exceptions involving joint enterprise,' master and servant, 7 husband and wife," an owner riding in his own car,9 and fellow employees.1° The rationale behind the rule is that the passenger has
no control over the operation of the vehicle, while the potential
imputation of negligence under the exceptions is based on the existence of control over, or the right to control, the driver." The
exceptions will not be discussed further, but are mentioned now to
point out that there are circumstances other than his own negligence which may preclude an occupant of an automobile from recovering damages.
However, the concern of this discussion is with actual negligence
on the part of a passenger as distinguished from imputed negligence. This raises two questions: (a) What duty does the law
impose on a passenger in an automobile to look out for his own
safety? (b) What actions on the part of a passenger may be considered negligent?
DUTY OF CARE
As a general proposition it may be stated that the duty of a
passenger in an automobile is to use care for his own safety commensurate with that of an ordinarily prudent person under like
5. Porter v. Jacksonville Electric Co., 64 Fla. 409, 60 So. 188 (1912); Swanland v.
Rockford & I. Ry. Co., 305 Ill, '339, 137 N.E. 206 (1922),; Smith v. Elliott, 122 Me. 126,
119 Atl. 205 (1933); Zenner v. Great Northern Ry., 135 Minn. 37, 159 N.W. 1087
(1916); Chambers v. Minn., St. P. & S. S. M. By., 37 N.D. 377, 163 N.W. 824 (1917);
Eads v. Tiede, 45 S.D. 190, 186 N.W. 823 (1922); Beach v. Seattle, 85 Wash. 379, 148
Pac. 39 (1915); see Restatment, Torts § 490 (1934).
6. Restatement, Torts § 491, Comment c (1934).
7. Lytle v. Hancock County, 19 Ga.App. 193, 91 S.E. 219 (1917) (Negligence of
driving employee held imputable to employer riding with him). Cf. Restatement, Agency
§ 212, Comment b (1933).
8. Senft v. Western Md. By., 246 Pa. 446, 92 Atl. 553 (1914) (In the absence of
control, negligence of a driving spouse is not attributable to the'passenger spouse).
9. Baker v. Maseeh, 20 Ariz. 201, 179 Pac. 53 (1919) (imputation of negligence is
dependent on owner's right to control); Restatement, Torts § 491, comment h (1934).
10. Peterson v. New Orleans By. & Light Co., 142 La. 835, 77 So. 647 (1918),
(Negligence of driver not imputed to fellow employee riding with him); Restatement,
Torts § 491, comment d (1934).
11. See cases cited note 5, supra.
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circumstances. 12 This imposes on the passenger the same standard
of conduct as is imposed on the driver: the obligation to act as a
"reasonable and prudent man." Imposing the same standard on the
passenger and driver does not impose the same duties on each,
however. The degree or quantum of care required of the passenger
in meeting the standard of the reasonable man is considerably less
than that required of the driver.13
It is generally held that a
passenger may ordinarily rely on a driver who has exclusive control of the vehicle, but he may not entrust his safety absolutely to
the driver regardless of impending danger or an apparent lack of
ordinary caution on the part of the driver.'
It is the duty of the
passenger to warn the driver of known danger and if the driver is
exercising a visible lack of caution to take such action for his safety
as a reasonable man would take. ' If a danger threatens and is
known to the passenger, his duty to warn arises only when it appears that the operator is unaware of the danger, that there is time
and opportunity to warn, and that the warning would be heeded.'0
A passenger does not have to assume the responsibility for management of the vehicle and is not required to be constantly on the alert
for dangers which the driver might not discover. 7 On the contrary,
the courts have been very careful to point out that the passengers
duty does not include the "abominable practice" of backseat driving."' Management of the vehicle, especially in time of emergency,
should be left to the driver." Action on the part of a passenger in
such a situation is apt to increase rather than decrease the danger,
and one recent decision goes so far as to hold that the duty of a
2 -'
passenger is generally to sit still and say nothing.
DUTY WITH REGARD TO DRIVER
The automobile passenger may be under the duty to watch the
12. Campion v. Eakle, 79 Colo. 320, 246 Pac. 280 (1926); Spencer v. City of Midland, 358 Mich. 346, 100 N.W.2d 218 (1960); Hubenette v. Ostby, 213 Minn. 349, 6
N.W.2d 637 (1942); Lamfers v. Licklider, 332 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
13. Cunningham v. Pulver, 327 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1959); Costello v. Hild, 152 Neb. 1,
40 N.W.2d 228 (1949); Alio v. Penn. Ry., 312 Pa. 453, 167 At. 326 (1933); Brothers v.
Berg, 214 Wis. 661, 254 N.W. 384 (1934).
14. Cunningham v. Pulver, 327 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1959); Sanders v. H. P. Welch Co.,
92 N.H. 74, 26 A.2d 34 (1942); Harper v. Texas & P. Ry., 146 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1940).
15. Carnegie v. G. N. Ry., 128 Minn. 14, 150 N.W. 164 (1914); Lamfers v. Ucdider,
332 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
16. Spencer v. City of Midland, 358 Mich. 346, 100 N.W.2d 218 (1960); Panokin v.
Borowski, 167 Neb. 382, 93 N.W.2d 41 (1958); Carden v. Philadelphia Transportation
Co., 351 Pa. 407, 41 A.2d 667 (1945).
17. Burgess v. Crafts, 184 Minn. 384, 238 N.W. 798 (1931); Costello v. Hild, 152
Neb. 1, 40 IN.W.2d 228 (1949).
18. Goehmann v. National Biscuit Co., 204 Wis. 427, 235 N.W. 792 (1931); see also,
Darling v. Browning, 120 W.Va. 666, 200 S.E. 737 (1938).
19. See case cited note 18, supra.
20. Yarabek v. Brown, 357 Mich. 120, 97 N.W.2d 797 (1959).
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driver as well as the road. If the driver is driving too fast for conditions,2" exceeding the speed limit,22 or driving in a reckless manner, the passenger must protest if he has time and opportunity and
2
his failure to do so is contributory negligence if injury ensues.. 1
How vehement this protest must be depends on the amount of
control that the passenger can reasonably be expected to exert over
the driver. If the passenger has no control over the driver, as in
the case of a female companion, the mere expression of displeasure
is sufficient.2' But the passenger is not bound to watch the speed25
dometer constantly nor to be aware of slight excesses in speed.
Neither must he watch for and warn the driver of his failure to observe statutory requirements such as sounding the horn while passing.26 He is not obliged to anticipate momentary speeding or
other reckless conduct on the part of the driver..27 To raise any
duty at all on the part of the passenger, the conduct of the driver
must continue long enough for the passenger to become aware of
it. 8 If the driver is sleepy or under some other disability which
might cause him to lose control of the vehicle, the passenger must
remain awake and maintain a lookout. In Perini v. Perii,2 three
brothers intended to take a non-stop trip of 560 miles, driving alternately. After going a long distance one of the brothers drove into the
back of a truck when he overtook it so fast he could not stop. At the
time of the accident one of the brothers was tuning the radio and
the other was asleep. In holding both passengers guilty of contributory negligence the court said that due to the nature of the
undertaking they knew or should know of the driver's fatigue and
because of his past conduct (speeding) they should have maintained a lookout. If they had been alert the accident might have
been prevented by a timely warning. However, it has also been
held that if the driver is known to be awake and there is no reason
to apprehend any danger, a passenger is not negligent in going to
sleep or otherwise failing to maintain a lookout.30
The passenger's knowledge of the intoxication of his host is sel21. Cadbury v. Ray, 340 P.2d 66, (Cal. 1959); Eddy v. Wells, 59 N.D. 663, 231
N.W. 785 (1930).
22.

Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932); Haines v. Duffy, 206 Wis. 193,

240 N.W. 152 (1931).
23.

Cordon v. Opalecky, 152 Md. 536, 137 Atl. 299 (1927);

Fulcher v. Ike, 142 Neb.

418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942); Wilson v. Oscar H. Kjorlie Co., 73 N.D. 134, 12 N.W.2d
526 (1944).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1926).
Yarabek v. Brown, 357 Mich. 120, 97 N.W.2d 797 (1959).
Willis v. Schertz, 188 Iowa 712, 175 N.W. 321 (1919).
Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
Gordon v. Opalecky, 152 Md. 536, 137 Atl. 299 (1929).
324 P.2d 779 (N.Mex. 1958).
Gleason v. Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
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dom raised as a matter of contributory negligence, but it is often
stated that the passenger "assumes the risk".3" It is very important
in automobile accident cases that assumption of risk and contributory negligence be differentiated because the former is available as
a defense only to the driver of the car in which the passenger is
riding and not to third parties.3; As between host driver and passenger it does not matter whether the passenger's conduct is called
one or the other, since either is a defense in the absence of a guest
statute; but as between the passenger and third parties, the passenger may assume the risk as to his host and still recover from a
negligent third party if the passenger is not himself negligent. Some
34
courts hold that the two doctrines are identical, 3 or related, but
most courts hold them to be separate and distinct even though
they may arise out of the same set of facts.3" Assumption of risk is
a matter of knowledge of danger and intelligent acquiescence therein, while contributory negligence is based on fault or departure
from the standard of reasonable conduct. 3t The former involves
notice of danger and willingness to encounter it, 7 while the latter
involves a breach of duty.31 Succinctly stated, the essence of concontributory negligence is carelessness and the essence of assumption of risk in venturousness. 39 The Supreme Court of North Dakota
has said that certain acts may be either assumption of risk or contributory negligence, but has been careful to differentiate between
the two, and to point out that while the host driver may rely on
40
In apeither, a third party must prove contributory negligence.
plying the two defenses under our guest statute, the Supreme Court
takes a position contra to the majority which holds that assumption
of risk is a valid defense under the statute,41 but that contributory

31. Borstad v. LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959).
32. Edwards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N.W. 875 (1939); Berkstresser v. Voight,
63 N.Mex. 470, 321 P.2d 1115 (1958); Schubring v. Weggen, 234 Wis. 517, 291 N.W.
788 (1940).
33. Porter v. Cornett, 306 Ky. 25, 206 S.W.2d 83 (1947).
34. Grabow v. Hanson, 226 Minn. 265, 32 N.W.2d 593 (1948).
35. Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 189 Atl. 260 (1937); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss.
814, 29 So.2d 646 (1947); Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N.E.2d 236 (1946);
Wintermute v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., 98 Ore. 431, 194 Pac. 420 (1921);
Schubring v. Weggen, 234 Wis. 517, 291 N.W. 788 (1940).
36. Hay v. Nance, 119 F. Supp. 763 (D. Alaska 1954).
37. Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950).
38. Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N.E.2d 236 (1946).
39. Hturm v. Windsor Hotel Co., 193 S.E. 57 (W.Va. 1937).
40. Borstad v. LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D..:1959).
41. Allen. v. Robinson, 85 Cal.App.2d 617, 193 P.2d 498 (1948); Smith v. Furness,
117 Conn. 97, 166 Atl. 759 (1933); Pierce v. Clemens 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d
836 (1943); Borstad v. La-Roque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959); Schiller v. Rice, 151
Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952).

NOTES

1961]

negligence is not.4 2 In states having guest statutes, the statute as
previously stated, relieves the driver of responsibility for his guest
passenger's injuries except in cases involving intoxication, willful
misconduct, or gross negligence on the part of the driver. 43 The
majority of states having guest statutes hold that contributory negligence is not a defense to an action brought under the statute, and
in Ledford v. Klein," North Dakota adopts this view in the case of
willful misconduct." But in the well reasoned decision in Borstad
v. LaRoque,46 the Supreme Court held that contributory negligence
in the case of intoxication arises as a valid defense under Section
9-10-06 of the N.D. Cent. Code which states: "Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his willful acts but also for any
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter, willfully or by want of ordinary care, has brought the injury
upon himself." The court said that considering the guest statute in
light of the above statute it is clear that where the guest knows of
the disabling effect of intoxication upon the driver and voluntarily
enters the automobile, he assumes the risk if a mishap occurs as the
proximate result of the host's intoxication and other hazards of
which the guest is cognizant. Further, the court said that if the
guest is unaware of the disabling effect of the intoxication or that
a dangerous situation has been created, but fails to exercise ordinary care and becomes "an actor in the chain of causation by reason
of his own negligent conduct,"4 7 he will be guilty of contributory
negligence barring his recovery. Reading the Ledford and Borstad
cases together, the obvious implication is that contributory negligence is a defense to all guest statute cases except those involving
willful misconduct.

42.

Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 166 Aft. 759 (1933); Grant v. MacLelland, 109

Conn. 517,

147 AtI.

138 (1929);

Coconower v.

Stoddard, 96 Ind.App. 287, 182 N.E.

466 (1932); Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N.W.2d 79 (1952); Finkler v.
Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N.W. 851 (1932).
43. N.D. Cent. Code §' 39-15-02. Liability for Injury to or Death of Guests. Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle moving upoh any of the public highways
of the state, and who while so riding as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have
no right of recovery against the owner or driver or person responsible for the operation of
such vehicle. . . . N.D. Cent. Code § 39-15-03.
Driver of Motor Vehicle Liable for
Injury or Death.
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as relieving the
owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation 'of a vehicle from liability for injury to or death of a guest proximately resulting from the intoxication, willful misconduct,
or gross negligence of such owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation of such
vehicle. ...
44. See note 41, supra.

45. 87 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1957).
46. 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959).
47. Ibid, at 26.
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DUTY WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN SAFETY
A passenger in an automobile is not required to keep as sharp a
lookout as the driver nor to voice warnings of every possible hazard
where there is nothing in the situation to suggest that the driver
may steer into trouble if not warned.4 But if dangers which are
manifest to a passenger confront the driver, and the guest has an
adequate and proper opportunity to control or influence the situation for safety, he is negligent if he sits by without warning or
protest and permits himself to be driven carelessly to his injury. 9
Since negligence depends upon the surrounding circumstances, as
well as the conduct involved, an act or omission which would be
negligence in some circumstances would not be in others. Thus
every case must rest upon its own particular facts.5 The modern
trend is to require the passenger to warn the driver of a danger of
which he has become aware and has reason to believe the driver
has overlooked or is not aware of.- Thus the passenger, when
possessing superior knowledge, is charged with giving a timely
warning.5 2 He must warn of known hazards which would include
approaching traffic or trains, 5 and obstructions or defects in the
road. " If the passenger and the driver have equal opportunity to
observe an approaching danger, the passenger has no duty to
warn, 55 unless he has reason to believe the driver is actually unaware of the peril. 56 If the circumstances are such that the danger
of collision would not become apparent to the guest in time to
remonstrate, the failure to caution the driver does not constitute
contributory negligence even though the passenger failed to maintain a lookout or to observe traffic on the highway.5 7 The passenger
is not under an absolute duty to see an impending danger in time
to interfere and prevent it. Within reasonable limits he may rely on
58
the skill of the driver.
Age does not affect the standard of care, which is always that of
the reasonable man, but a child is not held responsible for the
exercise of more care than can reasonably be expected of one of
48.

Le Mere v. Le Mere, 6 Wis.2d 58, 94 N.W.2d 166 (19'59).

49.
50.
51.

Fann v. Farmer, 289 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1956).
Ibid.
Rutz v. lacono, 229 Minn. 591, 40 N.W.2d 892 (1949).

52.

Edmiston v. Texas & N.D.R. Co., 135 Tex. 67, 138 S.W.2d 526 (1940); Jones v.

Daniels, 328 Mich. 402, 43 N.W.2d 906 (1950).
53. Baltimore, C.&A. Ry. Co. v. Turner, 152 Md. 216, 136 AtI. 609 (1927).
54. Sanders v. H. P. Welch Co., 92 N.H. 74, 26 A.2d 34 (1942).
55. Wilson v. Oscar H. Kjorlie Co., 73 N.D. 134, 12 N.W.2d 526 (1944).
56. Spencer v .City of Midland, 358 Mich. 346, 100 N.W.2d 218 (1960); Kelling v.
Howard, 249 Minn. 75, 81 N.W.2d 85 (1957); Carden v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 351

Pa. 407, 41 A.2d 667 (1945).
57.

Cadbury v. Ray, 171 Cal.App. 150, 340 P.2d 66 (1959).

58.

Jenasvold v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 234 Iowa 627, 12 N.W.2d 293 (1943).
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his maturity and capacity. 0 He is responsible for exercising the
care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age and capacity
to appreciate the danger and what measures should be taken for
safety."0 The same standard should be applied to old and infirm
guests and to those who know nothing about driving. "' The physical position of the passenger has much bearing on the care required.
As opposed to the front seat passenger, an occupant in the rear seat
owes a very limited degree of care.62 Thus in Baltimore, C. & A.
Ry. Co. v. Turner,"' the court said: ". . . the place which a passenger
occupies in an automobile is also important in determining whether
he exercised reasonable care and prudence to detect and avoid danger, for one on the front seat with the driver may have a far better
opportunity of discovering any danger ahead in the course of the
car than one in the back seat." While some courts state that the
front seat passenger owes no greater duty of care than the rear seat
passenger, they are referring to the standard, the reasonable man,
and not to the quantum of care.64 Thus the passenger is generally
held not negligent for talking,65 reading, indulging in deep thinking,"! eating 6 7 holding and playing with children,6 8 staring at the
scenery," or otherwise being distracted - unless there is something
about the driver's condition or the physical surroundings which
Would cause a reasonable man to desist from such activity.
Sleeping on the part of a passenger often presents a more complex problem. Whether or not sleeping constitutes lack of due care
is almost always held to be a jury question.7 0 The rear seat passenger is not required to remain awake where there is no reason
to apprehend danger or believe that the driver is not maintaining
a lookout. 7 1 In Jones v. Danels,7 2 the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that where the rear seat passenger's testimony that he was
sleeping and never saw the approach of another car was uncontradicted, the passenger was free from contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The front seat passenger is scrutinized more closely,
59.
60.
61.
62.
Krause

Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932).
Riehie v. Chears, 288 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1956).
Eddy v. Wells, 59 N.D. 663, 231 N.W. 785 (1930).
Weidlich v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 93 Conn. 438, 106 At.
v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928).

323

(1919);

63. 152 Md. 216, 136 Atl. 609 (1927).
64. Opp v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 128 N.E. 580 (1920); Barrett v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. Co., 190 Ia. 509, 175 N.W. 950 (1920).

65. Leclair v. Boudreau, 101 Vt. 270, 143 Atl. 401 (1928).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Fabiano v. Carey, 279 Mich. 269, 271 N.W. 754 (1937).
Ibid.
Lexington Ice Co. v. Williams' Adm'r, 236 Ky. 318, 3,3 S.W.2d 14 (1930).
Ingersoll v. Mason, 155 F.Supp. 497 (W.D. Ark. 1957).
Sackett v. Haeckel, 249 Minn. 290, 81 N.W.2d 833 (1957).
See note 70, supra, Keopke v. Miller, 241 Wis. 501, 6 N.W.2d 670 (1942).
328 Mich. 402, 43 N.W.2d 906 (1950).
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but when the driver is wide awake and road conditions are normal,
he may sleep with impunity. 3 The earlier cases held that sleeping
constituted negligence per se if an accident occurred because the
passenger thus entrusted himself completely to the care of the
driver, 74 but this has been modified by the requirement that there
must exist circumstances which would cause a reasonable man to
remain awake. The circumstance which most often arises is knowledge of a disability of the driver, usually sleepiness.- ' It must be
remembered that sleeping is not contributory negligence if the
passenger could have done nothing to prevent the accident even if
76
he had remained awake.
When the passenger is found to be intoxicated, he may be found
to have assumed the risk or he may be found contributorily negligent. But it must be remembered that the intoxication, as well as
any other form of negligent conduct, must have been a proximate
77
cause of the passenger's injury in order to bar his recovery. Similarly, if the host is the one who is intoxicated, but the intoxication
is not a proximate cause of injury, the passenger has not assumed
the risk as to third parties and may recover from them if they are
negligent.71 In most cases where intoxication is involved, both
host and passenger were found to have been drinking. These cases
are lumped under assumption of risk if the occupants have been
together throughout the trip or where the intoxicated passenger
knew or should have known of the hazards involved entering the
car. If such a passenger fails to warn of danger, and is prevented
from doing so by his intoxicated condition, then he may not .recover. 79 There are instances in which an intoxicated passenger has
recovered. Thus in Taylor v. Birks 0° the defendant first met plaintiff in a tavern and when plaintiff wanted to drive home in his
own car, defendant insisted that he would drive plaintiff home. Defendant was not intoxicated, but negligently caused an accident
which injured plaintiff. In ruling for the plaintiff-passenger, the
court said: "Plaintiff became drunk before getting in the car and
had no way of anticipating that he would be a passenger at all. He
could not be charged with a duty arising from a situation in which
he had been unknowingly placed. The trial court should have de73.
74.
75.
N.Mex.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Gleason v. Baack, 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
Oppenheim v.'Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159 N.E. 628 (1928).
Sackett v. Haeckel, 249 Minn, 290, 81 N.W.2d 833 (1957); Perini v. Perini, 64
79, 324 P.2d 779 (1958).
Richie v. Chears, 288 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1956).
Walsh v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 140 Tex. 385, 167 S.W.2d 1018 (1943).
Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 105 Cal.App. 340, 288 Pac. 81 (1930).
Graham v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 185 Ky. 370, 215 S.W. 60 (1919).
325 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1958).
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termined as a matter of law that there was no contributory negligence.",', The holding is logical and does not violate the general
rule enunciated above, for 'ifthe passenger is so intoxicated as to
have no power over the selection of the driver and the driver has
voluntarily undertaken the task, he should not be allowed to rely
upon a defense which he himself has created.
The natural condition of the road being traversed or momentary
hazards which occur on it generally do not affect a passenger or
give rise to a duty on his part. 2- If the driver is apparently exercising due care, the guest passenger need not keep a lookout for traffic which may dart out from driveways" or through stop signs
without yielding the right of way. 4 Neither is he negligent for
street signs instead of watching for traffic. s While some courts hold
that a guest passenger may be under a duty to maintain a watch
during heavy traffic,e the more preferred view seems to be that the
passenger may rely on the driver to maintain the lookout.17 For
example, in Carden v. PhiladelphiaTransp. Co.,," the court said in
answer to a charge of contributory negligence on the part of a
passenger: "A guest in an automobile is not required as is the
operator, to watch for the approach of vehicular traffic at street
crossings or to exercise any particular care in observing the roadway. He is not bound to call the operator's attention to an observed
danger unless he has reason to believe that the operator himself
was unaware of it, or seeing it, did not intend to take adequate
measures to avoid it." An increase of care on the part of the driver
may be anticipated when driving conditions become adverse due
to snow, ice, fog, etc. 9 It has been held that where the passenger's
vision is blocked by malfunctioning defrosters, the guest has no
duty to keep a lookout." But a minority holds that in such cases
the degree of care of the passenger must be proportional to the
probable hazards of the trip." The passenger is usually not under
a duty to discover vehicles illegally stopped in the road,9 2 ruts, em81.
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bankments or other temporary obstructions on the road,93 or animals suddenly appearing out of the ditch.9 4 The logical reasoning
behind this is that the driver who is watching the road must necessarily become aware of the hazard at least as soon as the passenger,
and the driver being aware, the duty of the passenger to warn does
not arise. In most such situations, if the driver is not in fact aware
of his danger, the passenger will not realize this in time to give an
effective warning.
An extremely high duty was imposed on the passenger in Ledkins
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas-Ry. Co., " where the court held that a
passenger in the exercise of care for his safety must warn the driver
of the danger of collision if in the exercise of ordinary care the
danger could have been discovered. The result reached was fair on
its facts since the passenger did not protest when her host passed
three cars parked at a grade crossing and then hit a passing train,
the crossing being one with which passenger and host were well
acquainted; but the law applied is contrary to the general rule that
a guest need warn only of danger of which he is actually aware.
A burden similar to the above case seems to be imposed generally
in railroad crossing cases, where the courts tend to construe the
passenger's duty more strictly. This appears to be the only instance
in which a passenger is held negligent when he did not actually
observe the hazard which caused his injury. Indeed, some courts
say that the passenger is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law if the driver has not stopped, looked, and listened, if the
passenger did not protest such conduct.9" This duty to stop, look
and listen may even be imposed upon the guest passenger himself.01
An Iowa court has held, that where a guest is sitting in front with
the driver and enjoys equal opportunity for seeing and listening for
approaching trains at crossings, his duty, in the exercise of ordinary
care for his own protection, does not exact a less degree of care in
maintaining a vigilant lookout than that required of the driver. " ,
Obviously he should rely on the driver to avoid the collision and
Co., 92 N.H.
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NOTES

should not interfere with the driver's control of the automobile.
While in most automobile cases the question of contributory negligence is usually a jury question, in railroad crossing cases, a large
number of adjudications of negligence as a matter of law are found,
probably owing to the increased quantum of care required." It is
in this line of cases that the courts have found more frequently that
some active or affirmative conduct is required. Here again, the position of the passenger is important, since admittedly the front seat
passenger has a better vantage point of observation than one in the
rear.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the cases coming within the scope of this paper
indicates that as motor travel has progressed from the horse and
buggy to the three hundred horsepower car, the quantum of care
required of a passenger has steadily decreased to the point where
his duty, as pointed out earlier, may be merely to sit still and say
nothing. This seems to be the preferable view since twentieth century technology has progressed to the point where there are few
situations where the advice and warnng of a passenger could put
an alert and competent driver in a better position to avoid approaching danger. There is no compelling reason why a passenger
should not be able to entrust his safety to this, apparently competent
and alert driver and thus do away completely with the necessity
for back seat driving. This view met with favor in the recent
North Dakota case of Satterland v. Fieber,10 ° where the court said
in its syllabus: "A passenger in a motor vehicle, in the absence of
special circumstances, has no duty to maintain a lookout. His duty
is to inform the driver of any danger of which he is aware." Putting the passenger under no duty in the absence of special circumstances sets up a standard against which the average man can
measure himself, but saying that he must maintan such lookout as a
reasonable and prudent man would maintain under similar circumstances sets up a standard against which only a jury can measure
him.
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